SOME RESULTS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC
SERVICE COMPANY LAW.*
During the past year, the Commission appointed under the

Public Service Company Law of July 26, 1913,1 has organized
and proceeded to the performance of its duties. That the confidence which the public had in the character and reputation of the
members of this Commission was not misplaced has been proven
by the patience and courtesy they have shown at the hearings of
the matters which have come before them, and by their endeavors
to judge righteously and to do justice between the public and
the corporations under their control.
The clear intent and purpose of the Public Service Company
Law is to put the control of the corporations therein referred to
in the hands of a commission with respect to service, rates and
facilities to the end that there may be but one body controlling
them rather than they shall be governed by various bodies, such
as municipalities, courts, etc. If for no other reason, the goverance of these corporations by a commission is of general benefit
when we realize that such a commission, both in itself and in its
officials, engineers, accountants, and other representatives, is
skilled in the subject, and as the Commission gains still further
experience in the future, will result on the one hand in fair service
to the public by these corporations, and on the other in an absence
of unjust competition, and the corporations will be able to receive
fair compensation for fair service, with a proper return upon
their investments.
This equilibrium seems to all those who have given the subject study and research to be assured through the powers given
the Commission by law, and through the duties thereby imposed
upon them. For example, a municipality hereafter is justly restrained from paralleling lines of a public service corporation
where there is no public necessity for competition, the result of
which might otherwise be to cause the loss of an honest investment by the unfair competition of a municipality through its
ability to cover up, under the guise of taxation, the losses it would
*The basis of this article was an address delivered at the annual meeting
of the Pennsylvania Water Works Association, October 22, 1914.
1

P. L 1374.
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sustain in the operation of a plant carried on for the purpose of
defeating its weaker rival. But while a public service corporation
is thus freed from ruinous municipal rivalry, it is compelled to
obey the regulations of the Commission with respect to its dealings with the public, whereby the users of the commodity furnished, or patrons of the service rendered by the corporation are
safeguarded to the extent that such commodities and service will
be supplied more satisfactorily and at no greater cost in the end
than if by a municipality, whose service is without control, and
whose wrong doing it would be most difficult to restrain. Again,
if the control of public service corporations were vested in the
governing body of a municipality, the result would be injurious to
the public in several ways, particularly since the control is not in
the hands of those who are expert in the subject, but raiher of
those whose training and daily employment are quite removed
from such knowledge. So also would such control be almost
universally partial and against the corporation, and the rates established by such a governing body would probably be most unjust and improper, particularly with respect to the rates to the
municipality itself, it being a well settled rule of all governments,
and of all forms of justice, that those who are to judge another's
cause should in no manner be interested in the result.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the decisions which
have thus far been rendered by the Public Service Com'iiission.
There have not been very many cases thus far decided, but those
rulings which have been made are clear, distinct, and easily understood, and have received general public approval. In addition to
the cases which have come before the Commission and have received its adjudication, there are included a few others passed
upon by the courts which concern the operation of the Public Service.Company Law and construe some of its provisions.
It is believed that the chief purposes for which the Commission was organized are the prevention of unjust and unnecessary
competition between public service corporations and the control
of the service rates and facilities of such corporations so that the
public should be served without discrimination and for a reasonable compensation. The cases may be grouped conveniently under these headings.
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PREVENTION OF UNJUST AND UNN-ECESSARY COMPETITION.

Under the Act, the consent of the Commission is required
before a new public service company can be incorporated, 2 or
such company can exercise any right or franchise under any ordinance or municipal contract, 3 or before any municipality may acquire, construct or operate a plant to furnish service to the public
of the kind already being served by a company within the municipality; provided that the municipality has not, prior to January I,
1914, begun to construct such a plant in that territory. 4 Such consent will be given only when the Commission determines that the,
granting of the application therefor is necessary for the service,
accommodation, safety or convenience of the public. 5 The new
company must show that the competition will be a public benefit.
For this reason, the Commission refused its consent in in re
Schuylkill Light, Heat & Power Company's Petition. This Company presented its petition to the Commission August 19, 1913,
asking its approval of an ordinance of the Borough of Ashland
granting the company the right to enter upon the streets of the
borough with poles and wires for the purpose of distributing light,
heat and power. The Eastern Pennsylvania Light, Heat & Power
Company filed its protest to this petition to the effect that it and
its successors had occupied the streets for twenty-nine years, serving tile community adequately and having sufficient plant for that
purpose, and without serious complaint with respect to its rates.
These facts having been found, the question arose as to whether
the approval of this contract with the borough would result in a
public benefit. The Commission held that it would not be such
a benefit and dismissed the petition, and, speaking by Mr. Commissioner Pennypacker, said :'
"The passage of the Act of July 26, 1913, and of similar
acts in nearly all of the other States indicates a general judgment that a reliance upon competition between public service
'Art. III, §2 (a), P. L x368

'Art. III, §2 (b), P. L 1368.
'Art. III, §3 (d), P. L. 1368.
'Art. V, §18, P. L 1414.
0i P. C. R. 122 (April 9, 19141.

'At p. x25.

THE PENNSYLVAN.1

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY LA J" 367

companies for securing adequate service and proper rates has
not been successful, and that hereafter supervision by properly
constituted authorities is to be substituted. Long experience
has shown that while the temporary effect of competition between public utilities occupying the same territory is to secure
lower rates, the final result is likely to be the absorption of one
by the other and then an increase of rates to pay the expenses
of the warfare."
And thus concluded the opinion:
"The Eastern Pennsylvania Light, Heat & Power Company has occupied the same territory for twenty-nine years.
Its plant is adequate. It has supplied the municipality and the
people during the entire period with comparatively little complaint. Should its rates be unreasonable, discriminatory or
unduly burdensome it is always within the power of the Commission upon proper complaint to control them and afford
relief."
The case of in re Harmony Electric Comnpany8 is quite similar to the preceding case. The petitioner sought the approval of
a contract to furnish light and power in the Borough of Ellwood
City, and was opposed by the Pennsylvania Power Company,
which had been supplying that borough for many years, had over
three hundred thousand dollars invested therein, and had rendered
satisfactory and efficient service. The borough had a population
of about four thousand five hundred, and there was no -present
indication of any special development in its industrial life. The
very able opinion by Mr. Commissioner Brecht reviews similar
decisions of other commissions. It was held 9 that:
"The contract between the petitioner and the said borough
should not be approved. Before a Certificate of Public Convenience is issued it must be established that the desired service
is necessary and proper for the accommodation, safety or convenience of the public. The Commission is not justified in
permitting competition, nor in taking such action as to invite
it, unless the area and population served, the needs of the community, or the prospects of the municipality, as based upon its
growth and development, reasonably show that the public welfare demands it. The power to regulate a public utility by law is
82 P. C. R. 42
'At p. 42.

(July 3, 1914).
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corollary to the duty to protect its property and the interests
of the public and investors from unnecessary and ruinous competition. In doubtful cases it is safer to draw the line against,
rather than in favor of, competition."
The case of Borough of Exeter's Petition.° also is in line
with the Schuylkill Case. The borough asked approval of a
franchise-ordinance with the Consumers Electric Company, giving that company the right to erect poles, wires, etc., and to supply
electricity to its citizens. The Citizens' Electric Illuminating
Company, which had been operating for many years under the
franchises granted to it, contending that public necessity did not
require the operation of two companies within the borough. There
was some evidence of unsatisfactory service by the latter company, and some complaint as to excessive rates. It was held :"
"Under the circumstances the contract should not be approved. Where two public service companies enter into active
competition in a small field, there will be inevitable duplication
of facilities, followed by merger; and as rates must, under the
law, provide a fair return upon the value of the property employed in public use, they will be higher after such competition
than before. The Commission cannot approve such competitions, knowing that when it is called upon to fix rates it will be
compelled to provide for a return tpon an investment unnecessarily made. The remedy for inadequate or unsatisfactory
service, under the Public Service Company Law, is by complaint to the Commission, and not by encouraging competition."
If, however, it appears that the new company will be a benefit to the community, the consent of the Commission will be
given. This was exemplified in a later petition,1 2 where the same
borough asked approval of a contract for street lighting made
with the Consumers' Electric Company. This contract was made
after due advertisement for and consideration of bids, but the
older company, which protested and which had been furnishing
the borough for many years, declined to present a bid under the
advertisement, and contended that the approval of this contract
would result in a duplication of poles 4nd wires in the streets, to
'2
1

P. C. R. 52 (July 21, 1914).
At p. 52.
Borough of Exeter's Petition,

2

P. C. R. 6o (July

21, 1914).
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the inconvenience and danger of the public. Chiefly because this
oider company did not bid for the light, it was held that the borough appeared to have done the wisest thing in accepting the proposition of the new company. Such lighting being necessary for
the borough, the Commission was of the opinion that the contract
should be approved.
'When a municipality or public service company enters into
competition with an existing company, without having obtained
the consent of the Commission, it will be restrained by an injunction until it obtains such permission. This was decided in Bethlehem City Water Company v. Bethlehem Bbrough,13 where the
plaintiff, a public service company, furnished water to a portion
of the defendant.borough which before its consolidation with the
borough had been a part of Lehigh County. The defendant
borough owned its water plant and proposed to parallel the pipes
of the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought an injunction in Northampton County to restrain the laying of pipes by the borough without
the approval of the Public Service Commission. It was held that
a municipality desiring to extend its facilities into territory which
is supplied by a public service company furnishing service of a
like character will be restrained by injunction until it secures the
approval of the Public Service Commission.
The approval of the Public Service Commission is not required when a company is incorporated prior to the approval of
the Act of 1013, even though it does not enter into the exercise of
its rights until after the time when this Act went into effe&. In
Pennsylvania Utilities Company v. Lehigh Navigation Electric
Comn pany' 4 the complainant company had been engaged for many
years in supplying light, heat and power by electricity to certain
townships in the counties of Pike, M.onroe and Northampton. The
respondent company was incorporated prior to the approval of the
Public Service Corpany Law, but had not begun the exercise of
its rights and powers until after the Act went into effect, and, in
so doing invaded the territory occupied and served by the complainant company. The complaint was dismissed and it was
held:
'1 P. C. R. 227 (May '8, 1914).
"2 P. C. R 74 (July 9, 1914).
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"The Commission has no authority to require a company
chartered prior to the approval of the Public Service Company
Law to secure its approval before beginning the exercise of
rights and powers under its charter."
But municipalities entering into competition in public service
are subject to the Act unless they have started to construct the
public service plant before the Act went into effect.1 3 Actual construction of the plant must have been begun before that time.
Mere preparatory steps are not enough. This is well brought out
in in re Consolidated Water Company's Petition.6 For some
time there had been an attempt of certain people in the Borough
of Coudersport to secure a municipal plant without any apparent
necessity therefor, there being no apparent objection to the rates
of service of the existing company. Prior t6 January 1, x914, the
borough had employed experts to investigate and report on a possible water supply, had approved a bond issue of fifty thousand
dollars for the construction of a plant, had secured an option to
sink test wells, had dug one well, staked out a pump house and
laid a short pipe from the test well, but no bonds had been issued,
definite plans completed or contracts let for the work. It also
developed that prior to the construction of the plant no permit
had been secured from the Commissioner of Health, as required
by law.7 The water company petitioned the Commission that it
request the Attorney General to prevent the borough from violating the provisions of the Public Service Company Law by introducing its water plant without the consent of the Commission, on
the ground that the plant had not been commenced to be constructed before January 1, 1914. The Commission sustained the

petition and held that the borough must obtain the consent of the
Commission before proceeding to construct its plant, holding that
the steps taken by the borough prior to January 1, 1914, were

merely such as were preliminary to the actual construction of the
plant, and that without having secured a permit from the Commissioner of Health the borough did not have its water plant in
process of construction by authority of law.
"Art. III, §3 (d), P. . 1368.
x P. C. R. x9o (April 24, I914).
'Act of April 22, i9os, P. L 26D.
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DIscmMINATIoN.

The Act provides that a company may not receive a greater
or less sum from any consumer for a like and contemporaneous
service under substantially similar conditions ;"s nor may the company give any unreasonable preference to any consumer or locality, nor subject any particular person or locality to any undue or
unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage. 19
Thus for those similarly situated, the services and rates
must be the same. Under these sections it has been held that a
natural gas company may not allow a discount to certain patrons
after the expiration of the discouht period allowed in the rules on
file with the Commission, and refuse it to other patrons. 9M The
great question always is: When is a difference in rates or service justified? The leading case is Goerlich v. Bethlehem City
Water Comitpany.20 The complainant alleged that the water company charged different rates for the same service in the same borough by allowing a discount of twenty-five per cent. for prompt
payment of bills by patrons in certain streets; and to those in other
streets a discount of forty per cent. It appeared that the property
of the defendant company was worth one million two hundred
and fifty thousand dollars and that its net earnings were about
thirty thousand dollars; its revenue was used to pay interest on
its bonded indebtedness and for cost of extending its plant, and
no dividends had been declared to its stockholders. Following
21
the authority of Hoover v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company,
and Railroad Company v. Behlmer,22 it was held that the discrimination forbidden by the Act is that of a charge "for a like
and contemporaneous service under substantially similar circumstances and conditions". Competition real and substantial, and
which exercises a potential influence on rates, may create such a
dissimilarity of circumstances and conditions that a lower rate at
"Art. III, §8 (a), P. L. x393.
"Art. III, §8 (b), P. L. 1393.
aIn re Allowance of Discount after Expiration of Discount Period.
P. C. R. 127 (September x, x94).
ai P. . R. 213 (Jtne 2, 1914).
:156 Pa. o (893).

ni1S U. S. 671 (igoo).

a
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the competitive point will not come within the prohibition of the
Act. Whether competition does produce such dissimilarity must
be determined from the facts of each case as it arises. The ruling
by Mr. Commissioner Pennypacker, is of much importance :3
"In the present case with respect to the streets to whose
residents the greater discount was allowed by the respondent,
there was a competition of a serious character. To these residents another supply was offered at lower rates. The undisputed testimony is that it was necessary 'to meet these rates
or lose the business entirely'. To lose the business would be
to render valueless the investment in that part of the plant.
The competition was the more threatening because of the fact
that it had the strength and power of the municipality supporting it. As to what constitutes such competition as wll
create a dissimilarity of circumstances and conditions must be
determined from the facts of each case as it arises. After giving careful consideration to the ascertained facts and the situation as it exists in WVest Bethlehem, it is our conclusion that
such dissimilarlity between the conditions upon the streets
named and the other exists as to make the prohibition of the
statute inapplicable."
Competition, then, is enough to differentiate conditions, and
it has been held in Borough of Lewiston v. Penn Central Light
& Powecr Company,24 that though the rates of the company in
Lewiston were four times greater than those in Huntingdon,
where there was active competition, there was no discrimination.
One of the most recent decisions of the Commission, known
as the "Anthracite Coal Rates Case", 2 5 intimates that distance
may justify differences. It was claimed by the petitioners that
the freight rates on coal from the anthracite regions to Philadelphia were unreasonably high, and were discriminatory. The very
elaborate opinion of the Commission sets forth an historical
review of the modes of transportation of anthracite coal, the
changes which have been brought about in this transportation,
the routes, distance and cost of transportation, and a comparison
of the cost of and rates for carrying bituminous coal from the
region where it is mined, and, pointing out that the rate for
= At p. 216.
262 P. C. R. 249 (November 6,

1914).

U2 P. C. R. 313 (December 12, 1914).
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anthracite coal carried to Philadelphia and intended for transshipment to New York, Boston and other ports "outside the
capes" was forty cents per ton less than that intended for local
delivery in Philadelphia, holds that the rate for such delivery
should be reduced to equal the difference. It is of value to quote
an important portion of this opinion :26
"On the other hand, the relation of Philadelphia to the
anthracite coal deposits presents to us an extremely unusual
situation. A city, whose founders located it upon the banks
of a river, may well claim that it is entitled to the benefit of
the transportion which the facilities of the river afford. An
iron furnace which is near the ore beds, or the lime beds, or
the fuel supply derives an advantage in its trade output because of the fact, and surely the proximity of Philadelphia to
the deposits of anthracite coal is a natural advantage of whose
benefits she ought not to be deprived. The very purpose which
the Commonwealth had in view in granting the rights and privileges contained in the charter of the Philadelphia and Reading
Railway Company was that the anthracite coal might be carried to Philadelphia, and the compensations to the State were
that her citizens should be so supplied. We may all rejoice that
the usefulness of the railroad has been extended to other States,
and to other activities, but its primary object should not be
permitted to be forgotten. Any effort to make Philadelphia
pay higher rates because her only means of securing this necessity of life is through the transportation afforded by the respondent roads, and in order that consumers in Boston or New Orleans may get their coal more cheaply, would be a reversal of
the natural order of events, and ought not to be permitted.'
The significance of this language is that it foreshadows
future rulings to the effect that rates for such important commodities as coal must bear relation to the proximity of the point
of delivery to the mine from which the coal is shipped, a ruling
which, carried to its logical conclusion, must mean that those
.who are nearer to a raw material should not be required to pay
therefor a cost equal to those more remote. The importance of
this ruling is most apparent, and, if sustained, will be far reaching, for the time may come when the commissions, National or
State, will hold, or legislation will require, that rates of freight
shall be upon a per ton-mile basis.
" At pp. 327, 328.
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The purpose for which the service is used is not enough to
make the circumstances dissimilar, and justify a difference. Thus
in Birdsboro Stone Company v. Philadelphia& Reading Railway
Company,27 the rate charged the complainant for crushed stone
for commercial purposes was more than was charged for similar
freight on stone used for railroad ballast. It was held that this
was discriminatory and gave an unreasonable preference.
The solution of the question of discriminatory rates in a
community were, for example, a water company, in order to reach
customers on elevations, must go to unusual expense, and therefore be justified, it would be urged, in charging a higher rate for
this service than to others to whom the water can be served without this extra expense, is awaited with interest. This is the converse of the proposition contained in the Goerlich case, 28 where
the objection was to lowering rates to meet competition, but, by
the same reasoning as is given in that case, it could be held that
the conditions are not the same, nor is it an unreasonable discrimination to make a higher charge to those for whom the service
costs more to the public service company than to others.
REASONABLENESS OF RATES.

The Act provides that a company must furnish its service at
reasonable rates and in conformity with the reasonable orders of
the Commission; 29 and the Commission isgiven power to-inquire
into and regulate the rates of the company.29 s The test of reasonableness is whether the company is earning a return equal to
legal interest on the investment. If the company is not earning
as great a return as that, the public cannot complain that the rates
are unreasonable.
In Matheson v. Middletown & Swatara Consolidated Water
Company, ° complaint was made against alleged unjust and
unreasonable water rates in the borough of Middletown. It was
found that the value of the plant was approximately one hundred
22

P. C E. 264 (December 4, 1914).

= Supra, n. 20.
Art. II, §1 (b), P. L. 1377; Art. III, §r (a), P. L. x386.
"a Art. V, §t, P. L 14o2.

Si P. C R1 187 (May 7, 1914).
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and forty thousand dollars, and the net revenue about eight thousand dollars, without making provision for a sinking fund or
depreciation. As the company was not earning a net revenue
equal to legal interest on the value of the plant, nor "an income
more than is fairly due after deducting the proper charges and
necessary expenses incident to the conduct of its business" the
complaint was dismissed. The same conclusion was reached in
3 1 Glenside is a small village
Ernst v. Glenside Watcr Company.
lying directly across the Schuylkill River from Reading, and is
connected with the latter city by a bridge. It contains about
eighty houses, but has no public buildings, manufactories, or warehouses within its borders. The village is therefore, wholly a
residential community. The people of Glenside have been furnished with water for domestic and other incidental consumption
by the Glenside Water Company, a corporation which was chartered in November, 19o2. In May, 1903, the water company
entered into a contract with the city of Reading to supply the
water which the company expected to deliver to the consumers
of Glenside when it commenced operations. In February, i9o4,
the Glenside Water Company began to supply the citizens of Glenside and continued the service until August I, 1911, when the city
was enjoined from selling water thereafter to consumers outside
its limits. The complainants alleged that the rates and service
of the respondent company have been unsatisfactory in that the
supply of water has been inadequate, that the water furnished
was unclean, and that the rates charged were excessive. The
testimony showed that although the iates charged were higher
than those in a large city nearby, the company had been operating
it at a loss, had not paid its officers and operators any salaries,
and had but few customers, as it was located in a small community. The Commission held that the rates charged were reasonable. The fact that the rates were lower in a large community
nearby did not prove that the higher rates charged in this small
community were unreasonable.
The Act further provides that the Commission, when after
a hearing it is decided that the rates are "unjust, unreasonable or
n12

P. C. R. iig (August 18, X914).
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inadequate", may determine what are the maximum reasonable
rates thereafter to be charged. 32 An instance of the exercise of
this power is shown in the recent decision of Business Meu's
Association v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company."3 Here the railroads entering Philadelphia after having shown that they were
not earning a reasonable return on their local passenger service,
were allowed to make certain advances in their rates.
The Commission has control Over the rates charged by a
public service company for service to a municipality, even though
this charge is fixed by a contract between the company and the
municipality. In Turtle Creek Borough v. Pennsylvania Water
Company, 4 a borough granted a franchise to a water company
and provided that "the rates charged by said company for water
furnished for domestic purposes by contract or by meter measurement, shall not exceed the rates now charged by the city of
Pittsburgh", but contained no definite schedule of rates and was
not limited in time. In Bellevue Borough v. Ohio Valley Water
Company,3 5 the borough gave the water company the right to lay
its pipes and mains in the streets, with the stipulation that certain
specified rates should be charged the borough and its inhabitants
for water. It is to be noted that in the Turtle Creek case the
rates were indefinite, while in the Bellevue case they were definite, but both were for an unlimited time. The court in its opinion
in the Bellevue case says:
"Is such a contract binding in the face of the declared
statutory policy of the law that the Public Service Commission
shall have the power to inquire into and determine the reasonableness of rates in all such cases? This question was answered
adversely to the contention of appellants in Turtle Creek Borough v. Pentsylr'ania Water Company. We did not then decide whether a contract between a borough and a water company, for a definite term of years and for specified rates during
the limited term, would be enforced as between the parties,
because that question was not then raised; and it is not raised
now, so that this will be left as an open question until it is pre'Art V, §3, P. L 7403.
"2 P. C. R. 262 (December 12, 1914).
U243 Pa. 415 (January 5, 1914).
"245

Pa. 114 (April 2, 1914).

THE PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY Ll IV 377

sented in concrete form upon facts calling for a decision of the
point. We did decide in that case that a contract of this kind,
unlimited by its terms, and hence indeterminate as to time
could not be enforced indefinitely, and must give way to the
general policy of the law under which the legislature created a
special tribunal to pass upon and determine questions relating
to the reasonableness of rates charged by public service corporations."
We may therefore conclude that the Public Service Commission has control of the rates of a public service company, even if
those rates have been agreed upon between a borough and a company for an indefinite period of time, leaving open only the question as to whether the courts will hold that the Commission has
the same power with respect to an agreement for rates for a
definite period of time. While the Supreme Court takes care to
leave this question undetermined, it is not difficult to read between
the lines that when the question is squarely raised it will likewise
hold that rates by contract are subject to the control of the
Public Service Commission to determine whether or not they are
reasonable or unreasonable under changed conditions. This opens
a wide door for inquiry and it is perhaps not necessary to discuss it at length, but it furnishes much food for thought
The Commission, however, may not assume control over
municipalities with respect to powers given them by law. On
June 27, 1913, while the Public Service Company Law was under
consideration, an Act was passed entitled "An Act providing for
the incorporation, regulation and government of cities of the third
class", but generally known as the "Clark Bill".36 Under Clause
Thirty-one of Section Three of Article Five of this Act, cities of
the third class are given the power to regulate the weighing and
measuring of commodities sold therein, including the measuring
of gas, water and electric current, and under Clause Forty-six of
the same section, cities are given power to make ordinances necessary for the proper government of the city, and to enforce the
same by penalties. On February 27, 1914, with the subsequent
amendment of May 29, 1914, thd Council of the City of York
enacted an ordinance requiring the York Water Company to
"Act of June 27, 1913, P. L. 568.
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install, at its expense, and maintain meters for the measuring of
water to all consumers, except those who use one faucet only,
for which the minimum rate of five dollars for each day's refusal
to comply with the ordinances. In York Water Company v. City
of York,"7 the petitioner alleged that these clauses of the Act of
June 27, 1913, were unconstitutional because of its defective title;
that the Act was repealed by the Public Service Company Law,
and that the attempt to enforce these ordinances by the city of
York would be an usurpation of the powers of the Commission,
and hence a violation of the Act under which it was organized.
In dismissing the petition on the ground that the power to restrain
the enforcement of the ordinances by a municipality is not given
to the Commission by the Public Service Company Law, but rests
alone in the courts, the opinion by Mr. Commissioner Pennypacker says:
"Many of the propositions urged in the able argument of
counsel for the petitioner may be admitted, to wit: That it was
the intention of the Legislature to place in the Public Service
Commission the control of the service and facilities of water
companies; that it would be difficult for the water company
to obey two different authorities; that the Commission has the
power to require the installation of meters; that obedience to
the ordinance would result in discrimination; that the Act of
July 26th, 1913, repealed the Act of June 27th, 1913; and that
the Act of June 27th, x913, is unconstitutional. Assuming all of

these statements of law to be correct, the inquiry still arises
as to where the duty is -imposed upon it, to ask the Attorney
General to restrain municipalities from the passage and enforcement of ordinances, even though they be contrary to law.
The Act of July 26th, 1913, gives to the Commission the power
to supervise contracts between municipal corporations and public service companies, and prevents those corporations from
constructing plants for public service without the approval of
the Commission, but nowhere is there given power to the Commission to supervise or control municipal legislation or its consequences. There is no such violation of the Public Service
Act as the Attorney General could be asked to restrain. The
municipal authorities are the representatives of the people in
their local affairs. This Commission ought not to assume any
control over the officers of the municipalities in the performance
of duties imposed upon them by municipal authority, unless it
"2 P. C. P- 185 (October 9, 19r4).
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appears with sufficient clearness that this is the meaning and
intention of the legislation conferring its powers. Ifthe Commission were to undertake to restrain municipalities in every
instance where there is the possibility of infringement upon
the authority of the Commission, its jurisdiction would be indefinitely extended. If, as is contended, the ordinances of the
borough are in conflict with the law, it is the not unusual case
of a wrong committed for the redress of which the courts are
always open. In its inception the effort may be restrained, and
if consummated, damages may be awarded. For these reasons
the r)etition must be dismissed."
In conclusion, the Public Service Commission thus far has
been successful in carrying out the purposes for which it was
formed. That it has been a direct benefit to the public at large
as well as to the public service corporations of this State seems
clear, and any diminution of the powers of the Commission which
would destroy its usefulness would be a wrong and an injustice
to every one.
C. La Rue Munson.
Williamsport, Pa.

